











Interdisciplinarity, truth and #reviewer2





Interdisciplinarity, truth and #reviewer2
Emilie Cloatre and Dave Cowan
Socio-legal studies as problematic
On one level, socio-legal studies is a curious discipline. Academics who profess such
a specialism often seek to “characterize, classify, specialize” as Foucault (1977: 223) describes
disciplines, in contradistinction to sovereign law. One consequence of socio-legal studies’
openness has been its over-inclusiveness, such that, as Cownie (2004: 56) observed of her
legal academic interviewees,
Some of those describing themselves as “black letter” appeared to be adopting
a very similar, not to say identical, approach to others who described themselves as
“socio-legal”, so that the line between legal academics adopting a doctrinal per-
spective and those adopting a socio-legal perspective is not always clear.
This interweaving of doctrinal law and the socio-legal represents one problematic –
socio-legal studies has yet to cut off its law head. However, the search for boundaries pro-
ceeds, in part, because of an apparent desire of socio-legal scholars to bracket themselves
off from the doctrinal lawyers. In a more recent vein, socio-legal scholars have looked in
on law, making a series of insightful observations (Riles, 2005-06; and the chapters in
Cowan and Wincott, 2017). As Blomley (2014) suggests, law both brackets in and pro-
duces non-law in that which it brackets out, and it does so through the technology of
framing. Socio-legal scholars have spent a considerable amount of energy explaining tech-
nical legal knowledges. It is this technical knowledge that is, as the textbooks tell us, often
contradictory (Cownie et al., 2010; Mulcahy and Stychin, 2010) and that begins the pro-
cess of the accretion of the “constellation of elements” that builds into technical legal
knowledge (Riles, 2011: 64). Perhaps also, it is this objectivity that provides the legal
technique with its power – its seeming neutrality, a commonplace observation, as well as
its insistence on relevance and market-centredness (Bankowski and Mungham, 1976: 7),
points that are replicated in our “great” textbooks. Indeed, Bankowski and Mungham’s
lament remains the case:
law is presented as capable of reproducing itself in the style of an hermaphrodite.
Where “outside influences” are conceded, they are usually acknowledged in the
form of a variant of the “Great Man Theory of History” thesis. … Since law
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textbooks encourage the idea that “the law” is somehow above “politics” or separ-
ate from it, then it is not surprising that they turn away from the study of how
different conflicts of interests have impinged upon and shaped the law.
(Ibid.: 33)
By almost complete contrast, socio-legal studies sets itself up as interdisciplinary. It is
rather peripatetic in the kinds of discipline with which it engages. And, this peripatetic
interdisciplinary project is sometimes regarded as unproblematic, even though there are
epistemological dangers. In his elegant essay on interdisciplinarity, Fish argues that there
are limits to what is, or can be, possible. So, for example, he points out that “importing
into one’s practice the machinery of other practices” is problematic “because the imported
product will always have the form of its appropriation rather than the form it exhibits ‘at
home’; therefore, at the very moment of its introduction, it will already be marked by the
discourse it supposedly ‘opens’” (Fish, 1994: 239). This problem of interdisciplinarity was
at the heart of the debate in the late 1990s between Roger Cotterell (1998) and David
Nelken (1998) about the allegiance of a “sociology of law”, a kind of insider–outsider
debate. That is, from where should the sociologist of law view their subject/object, and
indeed whether a transdisciplinary approach is possible. The debate coalesces over the fol-
lowing argument:
As sociology tries to understand law, law disappears, like a mirage, the closer the
approach to it. This is because as sociology interprets law, law is reduced to socio-
logical terms. It becomes something different from what it (legally) is; or rather,
from what, in legal thought, law sees itself as being.
(Cotterell, 1998: 175)
This problem of interdisciplinarity becomes particularly marked in those “law and …”
type enquiries that underpin much of socio-legal studies’ cross-disciplinary excursions. In
these kinds of foray, there is sometimes a kind of disciplinary imperialism being worked on,
one way or the other, which emphasises a disciplinary disunity most particularly in the con-
junction. Beginning from a laudable aim – to expand epistemological narratives – they can
end up merely re-affirming law first; that is, we see the “and …” from the perspective of
law (for similar arguments, see Nelken, 1993). We do not wish to suggest here that these
studies have not expanded our appreciation of law, most significantly in implementation
studies (which have produced the “gap problem” – that is, the gap between formal law and
its implementation).
Other scholarship, particularly that influenced by what has been described as the Amherst
Seminar (compare Trubek and Esser, 1989; Sarat, 1990), has moved beyond these opposi-
tions towards an approach in which, empirically, law is intertwined with society. Ewick and
Silbey (1998), for example, critique the “law first” tradition of scholarship, arguing that it
has drastically narrowed our vision, and that, despite the research which shows that law “has
no center and little uniformity, it is often implicitly assumed that the law is still recogniz-
ably, and usefully distinguishable from that which is not law” (p. 19). If we unhinge law
from its institutional setting and think about the cadences of legalities in everyday life, “we
must tolerate a kind of conceptual murkiness” (p. 35). Their sleight of hand was to make
a shift from “law and society” to “law in society” (ibid.). As they put it, “[r]ather than
something outside everyday social relations, legality is a feature of social interaction that
exists in those moments when people invoke legal concepts and terminology, associating
with law with other social phenomena” (p. 32). This move has led to a raft of scholarship,
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which has been concerned with the weave between legality and the everyday lives of
people. Rather than focus on the law among some form of explicit or implicit hierarchy of
exogenous actors, the shift to the everyday has produced some important findings about
law’s hegemony.
Part of that move has also involved a hollowing out of the meanings of law. Ewick and
Silbey, for example, use the word legality “to refer to the meanings, sources of authority,
and cultural practices that are commonly recognized as legal, regardless of who employs
them or for what ends” (p. 22). Uncoupling formal law from legality in this sense has risks
(Engel, 1998). Its breadth means that everything is potentially legal so that legality itself
becomes meaningless, a container term; as Mezey (2001: 153) suggests, “the law is every-
where so much so that it is nowhere”. And, if that is the case, how do we speak to data
that suggest that:
more salient factors eclipse the force of law on conscious decision-making [by
women in the street-level drug economy] and on their understandings of their
situation. Economic realities, gender hierarchies, peer pressure, fear, the need for
personal safety – all of these considerations call for extralegal (or quasi-legal)
measures to ensure survival on the street.
(Levine and Mellema, 2001: 180)
This approach has been most fully developed in what has come to be known as legal geog-
raphy (see Layard, Chapter 17 in this volume). Braverman (2008), for example, demonstrated
how different types of tree (pine and olive) identified the cultivation and non-cultivation of land
in Israel and the occupied West Bank, becoming a legible marker of property rights because
they are fixed (until uprooted, of course) and capable of being photographed as such. Trees,
Braverman suggests, take on the form of enemy soldiers. Summarising the interactions between
space and law, Blomley (2003: 30) has a neat expression when he “literally run[s] the words
together, and refer[s] to the conjunction [space and law] as a ‘splice’”.
This broadening out of legality has also led to a focus on what is sometimes reified as
“the social” or “society”, as if its meaning is self-evident and can be presumed to exist.
Even this label, however, has a crumbling edifice. So, for example, Fitzpatrick (1995: 102)
argued that the social lacks any objective existence and poses a challenge for socio-legal
studies: “whilst society depends on law for its possibility, law has to remain apart from it,
resisting reduction in terms of society. Law then also marks a point at which society fails in
its universal sweep and becomes impossible”. A social study of law “debunk[s] the false
beliefs that ordinary people entertain” about it (Latour, 2000: 110). Such findings began in
laboratory studies, in which it was recognised that the production of scientific knowledge
could not be studied without reconstructing the contexts in which that knowledge was pro-
duced (Callon, 1986; Latour and Woolgar, 1986). In her study of different scientific cul-
tures, Knorr-Cettina (1999: 8) notes that expert systems constitute society. The social, in
other words, is made up by its epistemic settings, which are themselves intertwined. As
Latour (1999: 273) puts it, “The question: ‘what links us together?’ is not answerable in
principle but in practice every time someone raises it a new association is made that does
indeed link us together”. In this version, power is operated not in potentia but “as the conse-
quence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting”.
In a particular brand of scholarship, this idea that the social is made up has been the product
of a recognition that, in social science, we have focused far too much on the human actors and
failed to give due attention to the way in which material stuff makes up the social. This is
a point that is made also about size – rather than assume that bigger objects are most powerful,
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an empirically problematic point, power is said to be independent of size. As Callon and Latour
(1981) suggest, a microbe exercises more power than the sovereign. Or, in a classic study, scal-
lops proved rather more difficult to harvest than scientists hypothesised (Callon, 1984).
Perhaps as a result of its own social label, socio-legal studies has been slower than most
of the other social sciences to build this set of understandings into its projects. It has
achieved most purchase in socio-legal studies of technology and medicines (see, for example,
Rooke et al., 2012; Cloatre, 2013). The recognition of the mutually constituting relation-
ship between law and society, as well as Latour’s own investigations into the Conseil d’Etat
(Latour, 2010), provides a fruitful mode for this kind of enquiry and has produced some
significant studies (Riles, 2011; Cowan and Wincott, 2015). Riles (2011: 72), for example,
has demonstrated that legal technique has its own agency; as she puts it, “our tools also
shape how we think, what we aspire to achieve, where we choose to go”, even if we do so
by acts of resistance (because such acts are always counterposed to those tools). It might be
regarded as quite surprising that socio-legal studies has not taken on these insights, because
law’s interdependent relationship with documents and artefacts more generally is so well
established that it is axiomatic.
In summary, there are significant issues with the label socio-legal and its apparently
unquestioning adherence to interdisciplinarity. The idea that the socio-legal is something
that can be the subject of study or studies raises further questions because it suggests that the
object of study is unique and homogeneous, whereas the disciplinary gazes are potentially mul-
tiple. Further, it suggests that the socio-legal can be the object of study, of empirical observations,
whereas so much is left invisible and unknown as a result of our ways of knowing. Like
Knorr-Cettina (1999: 3), we advocate that we should be less interested “in the construction
of knowledge” and more so “in the construction of the machineries of knowledge construc-
tion”. In so doing, we can recognise, like good ethnographers, the significance of the
enfolding of the material with the human. And, we can move towards what we have previously
described as “a subtler understanding of law as a relatively fluid, changing, and uncertain set of
practices” (Cloatre and Cowan, 2018).
Interdisciplinary problems in action: a case study
In this section, we use an anonymous review of a piece of our joint work as a case study
of the problems of interdisciplinarity in the specific context of the university law school.
We discuss our own #reviewer2, who regarded our paper as “fundamentally and hope-
lessly misconceived”. This part is not by way of an ad hominem attack – quite the reverse,
as the reviewer was expressing opinions that are commonly shared and accepted across
much of legal academia. As ethnographers of everyday life, our purpose here is to examine
the everyday life of peer review of interdisciplinary work. If, as has been suggested by the
literature above, we read things from our own disciplinary perspectives, we should be
interested in how others read our work. Further, we should also consider just how far
doctrinal law concerns are from socio-legal concerns; or, to put it another way, to what
extent are we all socio-legal now? If we treat this as a research question, peer review
becomes a field for experimentation. Behind the superficial shadow of anonymity, one’s
work is read and critiqued.
In the first part, we set out the general argument of the paper on which Reviewer 2 was
commenting, and our own (and colleagues’) critique of that paper. We discuss our observa-
tions on the peer review process, as interdisciplinary academics. We then discuss Reviewer
2’s reaction to it. We have assumed that Reviewer 2 is male (we do not actually know his
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gender or identity, because the peer review process operates through anonymity) because of
the way he expressed himself, and because our personal experience of the brutal reassertion
of what legal scholarship should be about, of the kind we share below, has tended to reflect
particular gendered patterns in academia.
We wish to make just one negative point about the review at the outset. We are wizened
old professors who have been in the “academic game” for a while. A negative notice is nothing
new to us; our skins are collectively thick. However, we expect reviewers to show courtesy to
an argument – even if they disagree with it – and to express their reviews in modulated tones
(and journal editors to intervene when they do not). We have learned from this review, and we
hope that readers of this chapter have the same reaction and will carry that through into their
own reviewing practices.
Our paper
In 2017–18, we wrote a paper that brought our separate work together around the study of
what we called “the legal consciousness of stuff”. We sought to present a general argument
that stuff has legal consciousness (this may be counterintuitive, though we redefined the
term “consciousness” in the paper to expand its range).1 We argued that,
at times [stuff] is imbued with a consciousness and that consciousness is often legal. It is
brought into effect by its interactions, enrolments, and translations with, and by, other
stuff, which produce versions of legality in action. This means at least two things: first,
stuff carries a form of legal consciousness that is unanticipated yet significant in shaping
legalities; secondly, where stuff is at the core of what the law tries to do, it is always
more than the passive recipient of legal framings, but can be transformative of legal
relationships. The materiality of stuff can challenge the law, and always does more than
is anticipated. Our argument is that this excess of material significance should not be
overlooked when seeking to determine the effects of legal consciousness. Materiality
evades and challenges the law; it transports its own scripts of legal consciousness,
which are themselves translated and transformed by those legalities. Both in the gov-
ernance of housing and medicines, stuff is what the law sets out to organise and regu-
late, yet stuff continues to frame those legal relations and possibilities on its own terms.
The examples we drew upon were selected from our separate studies. One study was about
“shared ownership”, a type of low-cost housing option that is sold as “ownership” but also
as “part buy, part rent”. It is a recognised form of social housing. In essence, the buyer buys
a share of the property and rents the remainder from the landlord. Really, the relationship is
one of a long lease, and there have been concerns expressed that buyers are unclear about
the obligations they are taking on. There have also been concerns because of a recognition
that the buyer’s security is limited following a court decision in which the long lease was
held to be a normal tenancy. Broadly, the landlord could obtain possession if there were
rent arrears of more than two months.
In our paper, we drew on two examples from this study: first, the marketing brochure
for particular developments. We argued that socio-legal studies has neglected such materials,
but that they tell us much in the way they translate complex ideas into simple pictures and
grids, which are then translated back into a vision of the expected buyer. In addition, we
1 For the sake of transparency, the paper appears on Cowan’s researchgate site.
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drew on a small nugget from an interview with a buyer, conducted during the project. The
buyer had referred to cleaning up a sweetie wrapper outside her home. There was nothing
unusual about that. However, it was the way in which the buyer used the sweetie wrapper –
she had used it as a device to divide herself off from social rented housing. It was the kids
living in social rented housing who dropped the sweetie wrapper, who didn’t care about the
estate; on the other hand, the act of cleaning it up performed her identity as different
from – and, probably, better than – the social renters. It was an example of what the litera-
ture refers to as an act of selective belonging.
Second, we drew from examples in which medicines performed types of socio-legal relation-
ship, to blur further the boundary between material vibrancy and legal consciousness. We inter-
rogated, first, how to characterise the fields of relationships that surround so-called “counterfeit”
medicines (a category that is highly uncertain) and how the materiality of certain drugs appears
to carry and mediate particular types of legal existence. We argued that the markets of “fake”
drugs are in part mediated by the particular legal assumptions that are embedded in particular
types of drug, and that such embedding is not so different from what has been labelled as legal
consciousness. Next, we described the many ways in which medicinal plants can reinvent them-
selves to escape legal categories and argued that reducing this legal vibrancy to one of human
consciousness does not enable us to capture the socio-material processes at play.
Throughout, we were explicit about our provocation in the use of the term “conscious-
ness”, but argued that what has been captured under that label does not inherently and
exclusively have to be human, and that legal consciousness scholarship may be missing some
important forms of relations by focusing too much on humans.
Self-critique
We recognise now that we oversold the argument. Our friends and colleagues told us so. As
one generously said,
I’m afraid I don’t think the paper’s actually about legal consciousness. I read the
paper as being about (in the very last words of the text) “the everyday operation of
legalities”. And I’m convinced by your argument about the importance of materi-
ality and attention to “stuff”.
Others, more directly, told us that they found it hard to see how stuff could possibly have
a consciousness. For what it is worth, we now agree with those critiques. However, before
we got to that view, we had submitted it to a journal.
We selected the journals (there were two) to which we submitted the paper carefully. Both
had a reputation for publishing excellent, cutting-edge socio-legal articles. Both were “general”
journals, in the sense that they are not aligned with any particular method or methodology, but
publish papers that are concerned with law and legality. The first journal rejected the paper
broadly for the same reasons as our friends and colleagues – their two reviewers were uncon-
vinced by the legal consciousness framing of the paper, and the data being both international
and national made it harder to generalise about stuff. The second journal rejected the paper.
The first reviewer broadly shared the same views as the other reviewers.
At this point, we should say something about the review process used by leading jour-
nals. As a general rule, papers submitted to an academic journal are peer reviewed – that is,
subject to review by other academics. It can, occasionally, be a bruising process, although
the best peer reviews explain how a paper can be improved and the reviewer’s reasons for
their recommendation to the editor. Peer review is both a validating and self-validating
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process, in which the peer reviewer enacts both expertise over the field and judgement as to
whether the paper itself contributes to that field.
Peer review for interdisciplinary scholarship – or scholarship that seeks to be interdisciplin-
ary – can be particularly fraught with problems, in part because of the problems inherent in
interdisciplinary research. For journal editors, the selection of reviewers frames the process.
For socio-legal scholarship, and when publishing in “mainstream” law journals in particular,
a danger is always to let the subject matter rather than methodology dictate that selection.
The not-so-hidden secret in academia is about the vicissitudes of the review process – how
reviewers differ in tone and substance about the same paper, how they critique a paper
because it is not the paper they would have written, or how they might be abusive towards
the author’s perspective(s). In short, the review process offers a veneer to the selection process,
and reviews might say more about the reviewer than the paper. Nevertheless, academics
engage in it (as reviewers as well as authors) not just because it is a rite of passage, but also
because it validates the paper. This method of judgement is built into academic lives; it has
a hegemonic status within the academy; and, oddly, it is rarely the subject of written critique.
We turn now to Reviewer 2’s critique of our paper.
Reviewer 2: on “reality” and the purpose of scholarship
Reviewer 2 experienced a strong reaction to the paper, concluding a 1,900-word review as
follows:
The bright side is that the authors need not bother with revising and resubmitting.
The fact that the framework of this piece has proven to be worse than useless frees
them to get on with work in their areas – “shared ownership” and housing, gen-
eric/counterfeit drugs and medicinal plants – which, if the authors focus on reality
including the actual law, could be genuinely useful and important.
We should not move on without commenting on the reviewer’s requirement for us to “focus on
reality including the actual law”. This framing of the critique – that we had failed to focus on the
real and the law, and that studies should be “genuinely useful and important” – makes important
dual points about ontology and the very purpose of socio-legal studies. Both of these points are at
the heart of the socio-legal problematic discussed above. As socio-legal academics of a particular
“postish” bent, we appreciate that there is no single reality, but multiple realities. This is what the
interdisciplinary endeavour tells us – reality is a question of perspective.
Postdisciplinary scholars might ask what purpose the real and reality serve. One answer is
to trace this response back in the ways in which law has been taught and researched in uni-
versity law schools in the UK. This story has been told many times (see, for example, Twin-
ing, 1967; Siems and Mac Sithigh, 2012). As Willock (1974: 3) put it, in a still-relevant
thick description of the problems lawyers and sociologists have in working together:
For the sociologist [law] is one regulator of human behaviour among many, a very
precise and overt one, possibly one indispensable to social life, but with no claim
to uniqueness. The lawyer sees it as marked off from other social controls, by its
coercive force and by its official character. For [the lawyer] law is not a mere pres-
sure to be identified, but an instrument to be wielded. [The lawyer] is not unaware
of the shadowy shape of custom, but tends to dismiss it as either insignificant or
belonging to the past. [The lawyer] distinguishes social sanctions from legal ones as
being spasmodic, undirected and thus unpredictable.
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One can discuss this tension between, on the one hand, the insularity of doctrinal law as
taught in universities and, on the other hand, the growth of social sciences, both as
a historical as well as an intellectual development. So, for example, in the 19th century, law
“was seen as ‘a practical’ subject … only … learnt by practice and not by systematic, schol-
arly instruction” (Siems and Mac Sithigh, 2012: 659–60). The 20th century was marked by
the growth of both the social sciences and university legal education, with the latter eventu-
ally largely displacing the “apprenticeship” model of entry to the legal professions. Ironically,
from the 1960s, significant expansion of university legal education concerned with preparing
students for practice ran alongside the growth of interest in and affinity of some academic
lawyers with the (also expanding) social sciences – although the latter is probably most
accurately seen as lagging somewhat behind the former (for example, the UK Socio-Legal
Studies Association was only founded in 1990).
Tensions between law as social science and law as single unit discipline in its own right
do emerge, often in unlikely moments. Whereas legal technicality is the subject of doctri-
nal law, suitably presented as a series of principles in textbooks, socio-legal scholars have
tended to ignore such problems, regarding them as tedious or distasteful (Riles, 2005-06:
976). The power of legal technicality lies in its seeming neutrality, its apparently atheoreti-
cal stance, as well as its insistence on relevance and market-centredness (Bankowski and
Mungham, 1976: 7). It is this which produces Reviewer 2’s “reality”, by which is meant
a kind of truth about law.
Reviewer 2’s rallying cry for scholarship that is “genuinely useful and important” reflects
particular discussions that animated the broad socio-legal community in the 1970s and 1980s
about what Sarat and Silbey (1988) described as “the pull of the policy audience”. The
concern was that socio-legal studies had lost its sociological edge; that, in seeking policy
relevance, it had been captured by the policy audience such that it was no longer its own
master. This call for relevance remains a tension within the socio-legal community and
underlines the significance of the judgement of whether research is important or not. It
also raises questions about the purpose of research – is it for academic endeavour (at the
risk of speaking to a limited, echo-chamber audience) or to have an impact on that part of
reality which is practice (at the risk of the sneering of sociologists). Such a binary is
unlikely to represent “reality” – as impact case studies for the Research Excellence Frame-
work are likely to tell us – but this question of audience does represent a consistent ten-
sion in academic life.
Reviewer 2 and “legality”
Reviewer 2 aimed the first part of his critique at the theoretical framing of the paper. It
would be fair to say that he had a strong reaction to the way in which we used and devel-
oped the idea of legality and actors. His starting point was the familiar one that objects do
not have consciousness, but he was less complimentary about our attempt “to bolt together
and latch onto what they believe are prestigious works by others” – Ewick and Silbey’s The
Common Place of Law and the work of Latour and ANT scholars. As regards the former, he
took issue with Ewick and Silbey’s label of “legal consciousness”, arguing that they were
not talking about legality because “the practice involving the chair did not actually create
any legal rights and the participants in the practice recognised that it did not”. Further:
If a practice does not create any legal rights, and those who practise it are conscious
of this – conscious that they are asserting extra-legal rights – labelling such beliefs
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and practices as “legal consciousness” is a bizarre denial of reality. Ewick and
Silbey are US sociologists; if the discipline of sociology in the US wishes to foster
bizarre denials of reality, that is their business. It is certainly not ours.
He then took on our argument that stuff can have a legal consciousness by reference to
Latour’s concerns that, “The hard-core natural sciences have aimed and claimed to be about
active human agents discovering, manipulating, and characterising passive objects” (Latour,
2000: 116). However, as he put it, “No one was daft enough to swallow Latour whole and
believe that things like chairs were conscious actors rather than objects”.
Sometimes borrowing from theorists in other disciplines is helpful, but not always;
amongst other things, context matters. My knowledge of Latour’s work comes
from my extra-legal interests; legal scholars have overwhelmingly ignored Latour,
for good reason. The essence and purpose of law has never been or purported to
be the investigation and characterisation of passive objects; the essence and purpose
of law is and always has been about evaluating human actions (including an evalu-
ation of whether, even if the defendant has done some wrong, it is the sort of
wrong against which the law ought to intervene). In this fundamentally different
context, Latour’s presentation of things as actors is worse than useless – as the
authors’ attempts to apply it demonstrate.
We will not comment in detail about Reviewer 2’s analysis of Latour’s ideas, simply because
it is less relevant to our purpose here. However, the way in which Reviewer 2 frames his
reading of Latour’s work as “extra-legal” and that “legal scholars have overwhelmingly
ignored Latour, for good reason” provides an important reflection on that socio-legal schol-
arship which has engaged with this work. Reviewer 2 is reminding us about the essence of
law, which is to be neither challenged nor revisited because of the truths that it sets down.
It is “extra”, othered by its outsider performance; it cannot offer anything useful to doctrine
and the reading of law because that is about human actions. This doctrinal reflection on
Latour’s oeuvre (and that of others in that tradition) might be critiqued as being blinkered
(particularly because Latour has expanded his investigations to law), but it points to the
proper disciplinary limits of law and critique in the academy, as envisioned by Reviewer 2.
Here, the process of peer review as a form of peer and expert engagement with
socio-legal work also raises fundamental questions about who the experts of socio-legal
scholarship are or should be; in other words, peer review operates not just as
a gatekeeper for socio-legal work, but also as a validating device. To “get through” peer
review, your peers must accept the validity of the ideas. Given Reviewer 2’s understand-
ing of “truth”, “reality”, “the essence of law”, and what is most important in our work
as legal scholars, Reviewer 2 offered his appreciation of the invalidity of our work cer-
tainly in the more limited sense of its appearance in a legal journal. In so doing, of
course, he pointed out that with which we were already familiar about the problems of
doctrinal law, and missed the point of our paper because it was extra-legal. This brings
into question how strongly socio-legal writing can be regarded as a distinct field of
expertise, against the classic thematic categories of legal fields.
On the substance of the review, the essential division between Ewick and Silbey and
Reviewer 2 lay in the significance of the extended definition of legality, something that has
no formal existence in law. This is both an important division for socio-legal studies and its
relation to the academy, and a methodological division. Reviewer 2 was particularly ani-
mated by formal law and matters that are defined out as extra-legal. This problem is both
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difficult and one on which there is legitimate disagreement in the academic community.
After all, as Reviewer 2 suggested, labelling extra-legal matters as legal is, in one view, “a
bizarre denial of reality” (ignoring the point about reality made in the previous part). It is
a contradiction in terms. It also extends the meaning of law to the extent that, as Mezey
(2001) suggests, it lacks coherence and meaning because everything can become legal.
Yet, if one suspends reality for a moment and considers the empirical findings of scholar-
ship, what gives the chair in the snow its particular power is that the neighbourhood
observes it. This is the methodological point about a shift in focus in socio-legal studies
away from formal law, and what that might mean. It is – to use a slightly different expres-
sion – a norm of everyday life. In collapsing back into the everyday, socio-legal studies has
found the way in which legality has this extended meaning in the mundane. This is not law
backed by state sanction, but norms that are understood as such and that attract community
opprobrium and reputational damage in the breaking. As Engel (1998: 141) suggests, “more
often law is mediated through social fields that filter its effects and merge official and unoffi-
cial systems of rules and meanings”.
Reviewer 2 and the irresponsible authors
In the substance of the review, we learn what Reviewer 2’s version of reality looks like.
Expressing himself in trenchant terms, Reviewer 2 commented about what he described as
our “purported illustrations”. As his comments on our readings of our examples unfold, we
learn about what he sees as legitimate or non-legitimate ways to think about the law, which
tells us something about the fragile place of socio-legal scholarship in the legal academy. In
particular, the challenge to opening law up to critical, interdisciplinary analysis reminds us of
how, in spite of its increased visibility, socio-legal scholarship is still built against a particular
(doctrinal) canon.
To illustrate this, we use only the parts of the review that engage the example of shared
ownership – this is both the example that Reviewer 2 comments upon in greater detail and
sufficient to make our point. The reviewer felt that we should emphasise how shared own-
ership “truly works in practice” as a matter of law. Back on the comfortable terrain of
“truth”, Reviewer 2 explains in some detail what we knew anyway: the mechanics of
shared ownership. We will spare readers the details of the scheme. What is of interest is
Reviewer 2’s conclusion: like us, he emphasised that there is a significant difference between
how shared ownership is sold (including in the material brochures our paper considered),
what shared owners themselves think it offers, and the legal relations that it formally creates:
So the guff described in the marketing materials, and the beliefs of the inter-
viewee – all about “ownership” – have nothing whatsoever to do with the actual
law. They bear no relationship to the legal nature of these schemes or the legal
position of the interviewee, and therefore bear no relation to reality. That is
a genuinely important point, which deserves jumping up and down and screaming
about – these schemes are practically fraudulent; and most people, even most law-
yers, are not aware of this.
Instead, the authors obscure the stark difference between these false representa-
tions/beliefs on the one hand and the law on the other through guff about “legal-
ities” and “legal consciousness” defined in such a way as to assert that there is no
difference between the law and false representations/beliefs about the law. That is
indefensible and irresponsible.
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Reviewer 2’s concerns that our approach was “indefensible and irresponsible” must be
addressed because, at heart, it raises methodological concerns about the absence of law.
What if, in the everyday lives of research participants, formal law is entirely absent or negoti-
ated around. This is not “bargaining in the shadow of the law”, but a routinised irrelevance
of law. Our approach to the shared ownership relation, as well as our focus on the representa-
tion of status through things, was “indefensible and irresponsible” because it ignored the sig-
nificance of the particular underpinning document – the lease – which places the buyer in an
appalling position. As Reviewer 2 pointed out, we should be jumping up and down about
that. Reviewer 2 perhaps overextends himself in describing this as fraud, but rather makes our
point for us because this is a colloquial rendering of fraud: it is the weaving of an extra-legal
version of fraud with everyday life. These schemes are not “fraud” as the law understands that
term, in either criminal or civil law.
Doctrinal legal scholars have described the shared ownership relation by analogy with
the fable about the emperor’s new clothes. However, methodologically, this places law
first and, in its reification of law, places law above everything (there is a kind of irony in
Reviewer 2 being, in Ewick and Silbey’s terms, “before the law” in his assessment). We
knew and appreciated this. Our enquiry was methodologically different: how is shared
ownership experienced and made sense of in everyday life? And, as a result, we were
able to note how shared owners produce and construct “ownership” practically, weaving
in formal legal appreciation of ownership as control over property, but also, and import-
antly for us, dividing themselves off from the other – that is, renters. We sought to dem-
onstrate – albeit unsuccessfully for Reviewer 2 – how shared owners express their
version of legal ownership, abstracting themselves from other tenures (even though, iron-
ically, they form part of those other tenures, as Reviewer 2 points out). This, in our
view, remains a neglected aspect not only of legal scholarship, but also of the essence of
law as lived experience.
Conclusion
Socio-legal scholarship, like all fields of knowledge, is permanently “in the making”. New
ideas continue to be imported and borrowed from an ever-increasing set of disciplines and
resources, with a view to developing new insights into what law is about, how it works,
and what it does, as well as what it might do. This comes with a number of difficulties. In
this chapter, we explored three main sets of such difficulties. First, questions of identity: as
socio-legal studies has evolved to assert itself as a distinct field of study, the precise nature of
that distinctiveness has not always been clear. Institutional pressures for more interdisciplin-
ary scholarship, as well as the numerical growth of scholars identifying as socio-legal, have
meant that the boundaries between the interdisciplinary and the mainstream have at times
lost salience. Second, socio-legal scholarship has rendered the boundaries of the “legal” fra-
gile, at times to the point of effacement. This results in the possibility that law can be
decentred as an object of analysis, but it also requires a proficiency in the interdisciplinary
tools needed to explore broader social patterns that goes beyond the simple borrowing of
ideas or methods. Third, socio-legal scholarship, in spite of its growth and increasing visibil-
ity, remains marginal in parts of the legal academy. Many of us have enjoyed careers where
we can play with disciplinary boundaries and have enough of a community of interdisciplin-
ary legal scholars that we have the luxury to forget about the precarity of such scholarship.
Every now and then, however, we are reminded of our position, and indeed of the persist-




Bankowski, Z., and Mungham, G. (1976). Images of Law, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Blomley, N. (2003). “From ‘what?’ to ‘so what?’ Law and geography in retrospect”, in J. Holder and
C. Harrison (eds), Law and Geography, Oxford: OUP, 17–33.
Blomley, N. (2014). “Disentangling law: The practice of bracketing”, Annual Review of Law and the Social
Sciences, 10: 133–148.
Braverman, I. (2008). “‘The tree is the enemy soldier’: A sociolegal making of war landscapes in the
occupied West Bank”, Law and Society Review, 42(3): 449–482.
Callon, M. (1984). “Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and fisher-
men of St Brieuc Bay”, The Sociological Review, 32(1): 196–233.
Callon, M. (1986). “The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle”, in M. Callon,
J. Law and A. Rip (eds), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real
World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 19–36.
Callon, M., and Latour, B. (1981). “Unscrewing the big Leviathan; or how actors macrostructure reality,
and how sociologists help them to do so?”, in K. Knoor and A. Cicourel (eds), Advances in Social
Theory and Methodology, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 277–303.
Cloatre, E. (2013). Pills for the Poorest: An Exploration of TRIPS and Access to Medication in Sub-Saharan
Africa, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cloatre, E., and Cowan, D. (2018). “Legalities and materialities”, in A. Phillippopoulos-Mihailopolos
(ed), Routledge Handbook of Law and Theory, London: Routledge, 433–452.
Cotterell, R. (1998). “Why must legal ideas be interpreted sociologically”, Journal of Law and Society,
25(2): 171.
Cowan, D., and Wincott, D. (2015). “Exploring the legal”, in D. Cowan and D. Wincott (eds), Exploring
the Legal, London: Palgrave, 1–31.
Cowan, D., and Wincott, D. (eds) (2017). Exploring the Legal, London: Palgrave.
Cownie, F. (2004). Legal Academics: Culture and Identities, Oxford: Hart.
Cownie, F., Bradney, A., and Burton, M. (2010). English Legal System in Context, Oxford: OUP.
Ellickson, R. (1991). Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Engel, D. (1998). “How does law matter in the constitution of legal consciousness?”, in B. Garth and
A. Sarat (eds), How Does Law Matter? Fundamental Issues in Law and Society Research, Vol. 5.
Evanston: Northwestern UP, 109–144.
Ewick, P., and Silbey, S. (1998). The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Fish, S. (1994). “Why is interdisciplinarity so hard to do?”, in S. Fish (ed), There’s No such Thing as Free
Speech … and It’s a Good Thing Too, Oxford: OUP, 231–242.
Fitzpatrick, P. (1995). “Being social in socio-legal studies”, Journal of Law and Society, 22(1):
105–112.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, London: Penguin.
Knorr-Cettina, K. (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Latour, B. (1999). “On recalling ANT”, in J. Law and J. Hassard (eds), Actor Network Theory and After,
Oxford: Blackwell, 15–25.
Latour, B. (2000). “When things strike back: A possible contribution of ‘science studies’ to the social
sciences”, British Journal of Sociology, 51(1): 107–130.
Latour, B. (2010). The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat, Cambridge: Polity.
Latour, B., and Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, New Haven: Princ-
ton UP.
Levine, K., and Mellema, V. (2001). “Strategizing the street: How law matters in the lives of women in
the street-level drug economy”, Law and Social Inquiry, 26(1): 169–185.
Mezey, N. (2001). “Out of the ordinary: Law, power, culture and commonplace”, Law and Social Inquiry,
26(1): 145.
Mulcahy, L., and Stychin, C. (2010). Legal Methods and Systems: Text and Materials, London: Sweet &
Maxwell.
Nelken, D. (1993). “The truth about law’s truth”, in A. Febbrajo and D. Nelken (eds), European Yearbook
of Sociology of Law, Milan: Giuffrè, 87–163.
Nelken, D. (1998). “Blinding insights? The limits of a reflexive sociology of law”, Journal of Law and Society,
25(3): 407.
Emilie Cloatre and Dave Cowan
108
Riles, A. (2005–06). “A new agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities”, Buffalo
Law Review, 63(4): 973.
Riles, A. (2011). Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Rooke C., Cloatre, E., and Dingwall, R. (2012). “The regulation of nicotine in the United Kingdom:
How nicotine gum came to be a medicine, but not a drug”, Journal of Law and Society, 39(1): 39–57.
Sarat, A. (1990). “Off to meet the wizard: Beyond validity and reliability in the search for a
post-empiricist sociology of law”, Law and Social Inquiry, 15(1): 155–170.
Sarat, A., and Silbey, S. (1988). “The pull of the policy audience”, Law and Policy, 10(2–3): 97–166.
Siems, M., and Mac Sithigh, D. (2012). “Mapping legal research”, Cambridge Law Journal, 71(4): 651–676.
Trubek, D., and Esser, J. (1989). “‘Critical empiricism’ in American legal studies: Paradox, program, or
Pandora’s box?”, Law and Social Inquiry, 14: 3.
Twining, W. (1967). “Pericles and the plumber”, Law Quarterly Review, 83(3): 396.
Willock, I. (1974). “Getting on with sociologists”, British Journal of Law and Society, 1(1): 3–12.
Indefensible and irresponsible
109
